A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (Yale Library of Military History) Review

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A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (Yale Library of Military History) Review"A Question of Command" is head and shoulders above its contemporaries when it comes to objectively distilling counterinsurgency theory. The first thing you will notice is that Moyar's treatment of competing theories is comprehensive and the book is extremely well documented and footnoted. Very professional.
The central theme of Moyar's work is the theory that counterinsurgency is "leader-centric" warfare, a contest between elites in which the elites with the superior leadership attributes usually win.
I was pre-disposed to discard this theory, but thought, "it may be an interesting book anyway." Well you can teach an old dog new tricks. His articulate and well documented arguments caused me to reconsider my biases and pre-conceived notions about the role of leadership in counter-insurgency warfare. You see, anybody can say "leadership is the key." But not everybody can get down in the weeds and spell out the specifics where both good and bad leadership made a substantive difference. This man does excellent, in-depth research is a good writer too.
Mr. Moyar's uses case studies, some of which are a bit remote from mainstream counterinsurgency literature, e.g. the Civil War, Reconstruction in the South (a major eye-opener for me), The Philippine Insurrection, The Huk Rebellion, Malaya, Vietnam, the Salvadoran Insurgency, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Vietnam was especially interesting. There is a prevailing logic as to how and why we "lost in Vietnam." I am not going to be a spoiler. I am a Vietnam "Era" Vet, and I encourage other Vets to read the book, especially this Chapter. I think it sets the record straight about a lot of half-truths and politically correct journalist accounts that were flat incorrect.
While Moyar forcefully puts forth his hypotheses on leadership as the key factor, he simultaneously castigates "ethnocentric" American civilian and military leaders that had little or no appreciation for Vietnamese culture and values (this hubris is not restricted to Vietnam, but is endemic to all counter-insurgency wars) Assumptions about the universal appeal of American political and cultural norms coupled with a lack of appreciation for the host country's culture was a formula for failure. Moyar's assessment of the Diem régime is most telling in this regard. My only complaint is that I cannot share his esteem for the leadership abilities of Gen. Creighton Abrams. I remember all too well how General Abrams encouraged the court martial of Col. Bob Rheault, then commander of 7th Special Forces,over the "termination" of a double-agent. I never thought Abrams, a straight-leg tanker, was a friend to special operations.
His chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan are also enlightening and credible. He had excellent access to a variety of Army and Marine leaders and leaves no doubt about sources and attributions. He also went "to the field" and saw those wars first hand. Those are not my wars; but Moyar gives me a true narrative of war seen through the eyes of men doing the fighting.
Finally, I think he opens a very credible, and new research stream for those interested in counter-insurgency, i.e. COIN leadership and elites. He readily admits that counterinsurgency operations are complex and highly context dependent; but demonstrated there are leadership attributes, measurable and observable, that successful COIN operations have in common from the American Civil War to our current conflicts.
Good job! I highly recommend the book.
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